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Overvaluation might drive a firm to use its stock to acquire another firm whose stock is not 
as overpriced. Though hypothetically desirable, these acquisitions create little, if any, value 
for acquirer shareholders. Two factors impede value creation for acquirer stockholders from 
these transactions (despite large differences in relative overvaluation at announcement): 
acquirers paying large premiums to targets, and investors’ correction of acquirer 
overvaluation during the bid period. Furthermore, acquirer CEOs obtain a large amount of 
new stock and option grants after acquisitions and realize a net gain in wealth, further 
suggesting that equity overvaluation increases agency costs and the resulting actions benefit 
managers more than shareholders (Jensen (2005)).  
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On March 22, 2000, PSINet Inc., a giant Internet service provider, announced its intention to 
acquire Metamor Worldwide Inc., a technology consulting firm, for $1.9 billion in stock. Each share 
of Metamor would be exchanged for 0.9 shares of PSINet. The price of PSINet shares was $49.50 
and the price of Metamor was $16.00 before the announcement. 
 
“The deal is also the latest example of how a company such as PSINet can use its highflying stock 
as currency for stock-swap acquisitions. PSINet's stock has soared 51% in the past three months, 
while the stock of Metamor has fallen 45% in the same time period.” 
                                                           --Wall Street Journal, March 22, 2000 
 
“Wall Street's initial reaction, however, was that the deal was better for Metamor's stockholders 
than for PSINet. Metamor's share price more than doubled, to $ 33.31 1/4, up $ 17.31 1/4 for the 
day. Meanwhile, shares of PSINet fell 16 percent, to $ 41.56 1/4.” 
                                                                                --Washington post, March 23, 2000 
 
"We purchased Metamor, in retrospect, at exactly the wrong time," Mr. William Schrader (then 
CEO of PSINet) said in an interview.  
                                                                                -- New York Times, November 3, 2000 
 




In an influential study, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) suggest that stock market 
overvaluation motivates merger and acquisition activity. If a firm’s stock is overvalued, 
managers have an incentive to use the overpriced stock as cheap currency to buy a target 
firm as long as the stock of the target is less overvalued (and the premium offered not too 
high). Such acquisitions would benefit existing acquirer shareholders even if they do not 
generate economic synergies.
1 Empirical evidence generally supports the claim that stock 
overvaluation motivates firms to pursue stock-swap acquisitions: Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, 
                                                 
1 Why would the target agree to a stock swap with an overvalued acquirer? Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue 
that target shareholders might have short investment horizons, hoping they can cash out by selling acquirer 
shares before the overvaluation is corrected. It is also possible that acquirers make side payments to target 
managers to agree to the deal through, for example, acceleration of stock option exercises, severance pay, or 
promises of future employment. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) further suggest that targets might 
over-estimate the potential synergies when market-wide overvaluation is severe. 
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and Viswanathan (2005), Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006), and Ang and 
Cheng (2006) show that acquirers are more overvalued than their targets before merger 
announcements and that the probability of using stock as the method of payment is 
positively related to acquirer overvaluation.  
However, an important, and unresolved, question is whether acquirer shareholders 
actually benefit from acquisitions driven by equity overvaluation. Rational investors would 
correct overvaluation of the acquirer’s stock, at least to some extent, once the acquisition 
attempt is revealed. Moreover, target shareholders would demand a sizable premium to be 
taken over by the acquirer. These two factors would decrease the stock price of the acquirer 
during the acquisition process and reduce the fraction of any synergies generated that 
accrue to pre-merger acquirer shareholders, eroding the potential benefits to acquirer 
shareholders.  
We examine completed mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. between 1985-2006 to 
examine whether shareholders of overvalued acquirers benefit from acquisitions. Using two 
different measures of equity overvaluation, we confirm that bidders are more overvalued 
than the targets on average, especially in stock-swap acquisitions. However, relative 
overvaluation (bidder compared to the target) almost disappears by the date that the merger 
is completed. We then sort acquisitions by relative overvaluation before announcement and 
focus our attention on the one-third of stock-swap deals with the largest relative 
overvaluation: we label this group as acquisitions driven by overvaluation, or OV 
acquisitions. The one-third of stock-swap acquisitions with the lowest (and often negative) 
relative overvaluation are assumed not to be motivated by overvaluation, and are labeled as 
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NOV acquisitions. The middle one-third stock acquisitions are excluded from our analyses 
to mitigate potential measurement errors associated with our measures of equity 
overvaluation.  
We find that OV acquirers tend to pay significantly higher premiums to their target and 
incur a larger drop in stock price during the bid period relative to both NOV and cash 
acquirers. Reflecting higher premiums, the targets of OV acquisitions realize a significantly 
larger increase in stock price over the bid period than the targets of other acquisitions. We 
also find that stock acquisitions driven by overvaluation have significantly lower market 
estimates of deal synergies relative to NOV and cash acquisitions. This result is inconsistent 
with the argument in Shleifer and Vishny (2003) that high synergies help justify the 
acquirer’s choice to use its overvalued stock in an acquisition rather than try to sell it to the 
public (via an SEO, for example). Examination of acquirer post-acquisition operating 
performance yields a similar conclusion. Specifically, merged firms in OV acquisitions 
experience significant post-acquisition deterioration in operating ROA. Taken together, 
these findings cast doubt on the effectiveness of acquirers’ use of temporarily overvalued 
stock in stock-swap mergers and acquisitions – pre-closing correction of overvaluation and 
the high premiums paid to targets appear to erode most of the gains that would otherwise 
accrue to an overvalued acquirer buying a less-overvalued target.   
These results lead us to the question of what motivates overvalued acquirers to buy less-
overvalued targets if there is little shareholder wealth creation. We find that acquirer CEOs 
in OV acquisitions obtain substantial pecuniary benefits following these transactions, 
specifically large new stock and option grants and increases in cash salary and bonuses. 
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These large increases in compensation dominate the relatively small decrease in the value 
of the average CEO’s equity holding in the acquiring firm.  
Combined, our findings are consistent with Jensen’s (2005) hypothesis that equity 
overvaluation generates substantial agency costs for shareholders. Overvaluation, by 
definition, implies that the firm will be unable to deliver the operating performance priced 
into its pre-acquisition stock price. Managers under pressure to meet such unachievable 
expectations potentially take risky actions that harm shareholder value, such as ill-
conceived acquisitions. Jensen points out that the prevalence of equity-based managerial 
compensation in the past two decades, such as incentive bonuses based on stock price 
appreciation and stock option grants, exacerbates this problem. Our results demonstrate 
tangible losses for overvalued acquiring firms (poor acquisitions that produce negligible 
synergies and harm operating performance), and that the CEOs of these overvalued 
acquiring firms are generally rewarded with large amounts of, principally stock-based, 
incentive compensation. 
Our paper is closely related to several recent strands of the M&A literature. Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) show that acquirer shareholders, in aggregate, lose $240 
billion during the three-day announcement period in a small sub-sample of mergers and 
acquisitions between 1998-2001, principally in acquisitions by what appear to be 
overvalued acquirers (high market-to-book). Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh 
(2006) find, as do we, that overvalued acquirers suffer more significant announcement-
period stock-price declines than other categories of acquirers do: the principal differences 
between our study and theirs are that we also examine total bid-period returns to acquirers 
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(and targets) and examine post-completion operating performance. Two recent papers 
further examine the wealth effects of acquisitions for overvalued acquirers, taking slightly 
different perspectives. Gu and Lev (2008) study acquisitions driven by equity overvaluation, 
and find that such deals frequently trigger large goodwill write-offs by the acquirer in the 
years after the acquisition is completed. Furthermore, Gu and Lev conclude that the 
acquirer’s stock price, on average, performs poorly after the merger beyond the correction 
necessary to correct overvaluation – these results suggest, as ours do, that overvalued 
acquirers make systematically worse acquisition decisions than acquirers that are not 
overvalued. Savor and Lu (2008) focus on unsuccessful  acquiring firms (without 
conditioning on overvaluation) and report that unsuccessful stock acquirers have 
significantly lower long-run stock returns than successful stock acquirers do, concluding 
that there must be some value to success for stock acquirers in general. In a similar spirit to 
our examination of the wealth consequences for CEOs of acquisitions by overvalued 
acquirers, Harford and Li (2007) show that acquirer CEOs are, on average, better off due to 
new stock and option grants following mergers. One way to interpret the results in this 
paper is that this effect is concentrated in the sub-sample of acquisitions by overvalued 
acquiring firms using their own stock as the method of payment. 
The reminder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our data and Section 
3 introduces our empirical measures of stock overvaluation. Section 4 investigates the 
relative overvaluation of the acquirer to the target and how it varies during the acquisition 
process. Section 5 examines acquisition synergies post-acquisition operating performance. 
  5 
Section 6 investigates changes in compensation and wealth of acquirer CEOs following 
acquisitions. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Data  
Our mergers and acquisitions data are obtained from the Securities Data Company’s 
(SDC) U.S. database.  We use the following criteria to select the final sample: 
The acquisition is announced and completed between 1985 and 2006. 
Both the acquirer and target are public firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq. 
The deal value is at least $10 million and at least 1% of the acquirer’s market value of 
equity. 
The acquirer controls less than 50% of the target’s shares prior to the announcement and 
owns 100% of the target’s shares after the transaction. 
Both the acquirer and target has positive book value of equity and sufficient data items 
in the Compustat and CRSP merged database to compute market-to-book (assets) ratios at 
the end of the fiscal year prior to announcement. 
The final sample has 1,367 stock-financed mergers, 692 cash-financed mergers, and 990 
mixed-financed mergers. Table 1 reports the number of acquisitions by the calendar year of 
acquisition announcement and the relative deal size—the ratio of deal value to the 
acquirer’s market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year prior to announcement. 
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Consistent with extant studies, there are more mergers and acquisitions in the late 1980s 
and during 1994-2000. Cash-financed acquisitions appear relatively more popular in the 
1980s, but since 1989 the majority of the acquisitions are financed, at least partially, by 
stock. On average, the deal value is 24% of the acquirer’s existing market value of equity.  
Table 2 summarizes firm characteristics and the operating and stock price performance 
of the merging firms in the fiscal year prior to the acquisition announcement. Overall, 
bidders are larger in size, have better operating performance, and have higher leverage than 
targets. But there are no substantial differences between bidders that use stock as the 
method of payment and those that use cash, nor between the targets in these two groups. 
Relative to the market, stock bidders experience a significant price increase in the year prior 
to the announcement, while all targets earn returns that are approximately equal to the 
market return.  
 
3. Measures of stock overvaluation 
We use two different methods to measure equity overvaluation for both acquirers and 
targets. The first follows a methodology developed by Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and 
Viswanathan (2005, hereafter RKRV), in which the market-to-book equity ratio is 
decomposed into components related to misvaluation and related to growth options. In 
other words, this method produces a measure of misevaluation while controlling for 
systematic differences in growth options among firms and industries. This decomposition 
has also been used in recent studies such as Hertzel and Li (2007) and Ma, Whidbee, and 
Zhang (2008).   
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A firm’s log market-to-book equity ratio (M/B) can be decomposed into two items, 
), / ln( ) / ln( ) / B V V M B M                                    ln( + =                    (1) 
where M is the observed market value of equity and B is the book value of equity. V 
stands for the intrinsic value of equity, which is unobservable. Previous studies, for 
example Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999), Ang and Cheng (2006), and Dong, 
Hershleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006), use a residual income model from the 
accounting literature to estimate V. However the residual income model relies on a number 
of fairly restrictive assumptions, and, more importantly, the use of analyst forecasts (to 
compute residual income) would bias our tests toward large M&A transactions.  
RKRV (2005) relax the residual income model and assume that a firm’s intrinsic value 
is a linear function of its book value of equity, net income (i.e., the growth of book value of 
equity), and leverage. The parameters of the linear function are allowed to vary over time 
and across industries to reflect the variation in investment opportunities across times and 
industries. The parameters can also capture differencse in discount rates amongst firms. 
Specifically,  
01 2 3 ( 0 ) 4 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) it jt jt it jt it jt it jt it it MB N I I N I L E V α αα α α < =+ + + + + ε
|| NI
               (2) 
it stands for the absolute value of net income of firm i at time t.  (0 ) I < is an indicator 
variable which equals one for negative net income and zero otherwise. LEV is the market 
leverage ratio.  it ε  captures the deviation of intrinsic value from the observed market value 
of equity and, therefore, is a natural proxy for misvaluation. 
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We run cross-sectional regressions of Eq. (2) for each industry and each year to 
estimate the parameters  jt α . The subscript j stands for industry. We use the industry 
classification scheme developed by Fama and French (1997) to classify firms into 12 
industries. We find similar results to RKRV (2005). These three variables, i.e., book value 
of equity, net income, and leverage ratio, are able to explain the within-industry cross-
sectional variations of market value of equity well, with regression R2s over 80% for 
almost all industries.  
The residual from Eq. (2)  it ε  can be interpreted as the firm-level mispricing at a point 
of time. Previous studies suggest, however, that there is an important component of 
industry-specific misvaluation, and the magnitude of industry-level misvaluation also varies 
over time. So the effective mispricing for a firm should be the sum of firm-level and 
industry-level mispricing. Following RKRV (2005), we take the time-series average of ˆ jt α , 




α α = ∑ . The 
final measure of RKRV mispricing is: 
01 2 3 ( 0 ) 4 ln( / ) ln( ) [ ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ] it it it j j it j it j it j it M VM B N I I N I L E < V αα α α α =− + + + +         (3). 
Our second measure of overvaluation is the industry-adjusted market-to-book ratio of 
equity, 













                                                                                                   
                                                                                                                                         (4)                           
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    .() it
M
B
is the market-to-book equity ratio of stock i at time t. () jt
M
B
is the median 
market-to-book equity ratio of industry j which stock i belongs at time t. The subtraction of 
the industry median is intended to control for investment opportunities or risk. We use the 
Fama and French (1997) 48-industry scheme to classify firms into industries. A positive 
number suggests overvaluation relative to the industry median while a negative number 
suggests undervaluation. This measure has been used by previous studies such as Ang and 
Cheng (2006).  
Table 3 reports the results of RKRV decomposition of the market-to-book equity ratio 
and the industry-adjusted market-to-book equity ratio for merging firms. The cross-firm 
correlations between these two measures of overvaluation are over 0.60, thus results from 
these two methods are very similar. Consistent with the predictions of Shleifer and Vishny 
(2003) and the empirical evidence in RKRV (2005), Ang and Cheng (2006), and Dong et al. 
(2006), we find that bidders have significantly higher market-to-book ratios and are 
overpriced by more than targets. Among bidders, those undertaking stock-financed 
acquisitions are overvalued by more than cash-financed bidders. Targets acquired by stock 
bidders are generally overvalued prior to the merger, but targets acquired by cash bidders 
are approximately fairly valued. Overall, the large overvaluation of the acquirer relative to 
the target is consistent with the Shleifer and Vishny (2003) explanation of the motivation 
for stock-financed acquisitions.2  
 
                                                 
2  However, the stock of cash bidders is also more overvalued than the stock of their targets. If relative 
overvaluation determines bidder’s choice for the medium of payment, as suggested by Shleifer and Vishny 
(2003), this raises a question that why don’t these bidders use stock instead of cash as the medium of payment. 
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4. Relative overvaluation of the acquirer to the target 
As long as the acquirer’s stock is more overvalued than the target’s stock, a stock-swap 
acquisition would benefit acquirer shareholders. As an ex-ante motivation for acquisitions, 
however, this justification overlooks two typical facts about stock acquisitions. First, the 
acquirer often needs to pay a significant premium to take over the target. Second, the 
revelation of acquisition attempt signals information to the market and during the bid period 
investors may correct the overvaluation of the acquirer stock to a large extent. As a result, 
the stock price of the target typically increases and the stock price of the acquirer typically 
decreases. This price movement of the merging firms shrinks or even eliminates the relative 
overvaluation that initially motivates the acquisition.  
Table 4 shows the relative overvaluation of the stock-financed merging firms at the end 
of the month before the merger announcement and on the date of completion. The results of 
Panel A are based on the RKRV measure and the results of Panel B are based on the 
industry-adjusted measure of overvaluation. Both acquirers and targets in the stock mergers 
are overvalued on average before the announcement but acquirers tend to be more 
overvalued than their targets (consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (2003)). However, the 
relative overvaluation of the acquirer declines considerably by the date on which the merger 
is finally consummated. As long as the terms of the acquisition, specifically the exchange 
ratio at which target stock is converted into acquirer stock, do not change to reflect the 
change in relative valuation, the acquiring firm will be able to lock in the transactional 
gains from acquiring hard assets using overvalued paper. What these results do suggest, 
however, is that the relative overvaluation that may have motivated the acquirer to pursue a 
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transaction in the first place almost completely dissipates by the time the transaction is 
completed. 
Next we examine changes in stock price for the acquirer and target during the 
acquisition process. We first sort our sample by overvaluation of the acquirer relative to the 
target before the announcement and divide stock-financed acquisitions into terciles. The top 
third with the highest values of relative overvaluation are more likely to be motivated by 
the stock overvaluation of the acquirer relative to the target. We label this group OV 
acquisitions—acquisitions driven by stock overvaluation. The bottom third of acquisitions 
with the lowest values of relative overvaluation are assumed not to be driven by stock 
overvaluation. We label these NOV acquisitions. Each of these two groups has 446 
acquisitions. We exclude the middle third to mitigate any potential effects of measurement 
errors associated with our measures of overvaluation. As our research question is whether 
OV acquisitions generate value for the shareholders of acquirer, we use NOV and cash 
acquisitions as a benchmark in the following analyses.  
We follow the standard event study methodology to compute a three-day cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) for each acquirer, a CAR from day -1 to day +1 relative to the 
announcement day. The market model is employed to estimate CARs. In particular, we use 
the CRSP value-weighted index as the market portfolio, estimate the parameters of the 
market model using returns from the trading day -253 to day -45, and use the estimated 
parameters to compute the expected return during the event window.3 The daily pricing 
                                                 
3 Schwert (1996) finds that target stock prices tend to runup beginning on trading day -42 on average, and 
suggests that information about the acquisition might leak out during this period. 
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errors—the differences between the realized return and the estimated expected return are 
cumulated over the three days of the event window to compute CARs.  
Table 5 reports CARs respectively for stock bidders in the OV group, stock bidders in 
the NOV group, and cash bidders. Stock bidders realize significantly negative CARs in the 
three-day announcement window. Both the mean and median CARs for cash bidders are 
positive, though only the mean is statistically significantly different from zero. If we 
compare the three-day announcement CARs of OV bidders to that of NOV or cash bidders, 
OV stock bidders experience substantially larger drops in stock price (approximately 1% 
more negative CARs relative to NOV stock bidders and 4% more negative relative to cash 
bidders, both statistically significant at greater than the 5% level).  
The market’s assessment at announcement is, however, affected by the expected 
probability of merger completion – the announcement return potentially underestimates the 
value implications of the mergers that are finally completed. Following Andrade et al. 
(2001), we compute a full-period CAR from 20 days prior to the announcement date 
through to the completion date, [-20, close]. The inclusion of 20 days before the 
announcement is to account for the possible price movement due to investors’ anticipation 
of the merger. Table 5 shows that the results using CARs during the full bid period are very 
similar to the results from three-day announcement returns. Stock bidders realize 
significantly negative returns while cash bidders do not. Among stock bidders, those in the 
OV group incur substantially more negative returns than those in the NOV group. The 
differences in means or medians are all statistically significantly different from zero with p-
values below 0.001.  
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The evidence that OV bidders realize significantly lower CARs than NOV bidders and 
cash bidders suggests one of three possibilities: (i) OV acquirers pay significantly higher 
premiums to acquire their target than other types of bidders do; (ii) the market is pessimistic 
that OV acquirers are able to create value from these acquisitions (i.e., these deals generate 
the lowest or even negative synergies); or (iii) the market substantially corrects the 
overvaluation of OV acquirers around and after announcement. A distinction between (ii) 
and (iii) above is difficult to infer from stock price changes alone, because changes in 
market value potentially reflect both effects. Therefore, later in this paper we rely on post-
acquisition differences in operating performance to assess the scope for value creation by 
OV stock acquirers. 
We can, however, say something about target premiums ((i) above) using stock price 
data. Specifically, we measure acquisition premiums using the approach suggested in 
Schwert (1996), where the premium is the sum of the pre-bid run-up and the post-
announcement increase in the target’s stock price. We therefore estimate acquisition 
premiums as the CAR of the target from trading day -42 to the date of deal completion.4 
The results are reported in the bottom panel of Table 5. Consistent with the acquirer return 
evidence, OV bidders pay substantially higher premiums than NOV bidders do. Bidders in 
the OV group pay an average acquisition premium of 35.33% for their target while NOV 
bidders pay an average premium of 19.87% (using the RKRV measure to classify OV 
groups). The difference is even more striking if the industry-adjusted measure of 
                                                 
4 Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter (2007) adopt a similar method to estimate acquisition premium.  
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overvaluation is used to define OV groups. Our evidence suggests, however, that the 
premiums paid by OV stock bidders are about equal to the premiums paid by cash bidders.  
Next we examine if the higher premium paid by OV bidders is driven by the differences 
in target firm and deal characteristics. We run a regression of acquisition premium on 
various target and deal characteristics variables plus an indicator variable OV that takes the 
value of one if the deal is in the OV group and zero otherwise. Bargeron, Schlingemann, 
Stulz, and Zutter (2007) use a similar method to examine if private acquirers pay a different 
premium from public acquirers to public targets. We follow their study to construct the 
control variables. Table 6 presents the regression results. One set of results is for stock 
mergers only and the other for both stock and cash mergers. We find that controlling for 
target firm and deal characteristics, OV bidders tend to pay to their target an average 
premium of 12% higher than other bidders. The differences are statistically significant.  
5. Do acquisitions driven by stock overvaluation generate 
synergies? 
Why do OV acquirers pay such high premiums in acquisitions? Shleifer and Vishny 
(2003) emphasize the importance of having high synergies to justify the acquirer’s choice 
to make an acquisition, and it is possible that acquisitions by overvalued acquirers would 
actually generate larger synergies than NOV and cash-financed acquisitions (thereby 
justifying the higher premiums). In this section we investigate whether acquisitions driven 
by stock overvaluation generate larger synergies than other acquisitions using two 
techniques: backing out synergies from the combined stock price movements of the 
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acquirer and target around deal announcement (section 5.1) and examining the post-
completion operating performance of the acquirer (section 5.2). 
5.1. Acquisition synergies derived from stock returns 
We estimate merger synergies by using a method similar to Moeller, Schlingemann, and 
Stulz (2005). In particular, we estimate dollar abnormal returns by multiplying the CAR 
over the bid period [trading day -20, close] by the market value of equity of the firm 21 
trading days before the announcement. Acquisition synergies are then calculated as the sum 
of the dollar abnormal returns for the bidder and the target divided by the market value of 
equity of the merged firm upon completion, 
       
[] () [] ( )
arg arg bidder bidder t et t et
− 21 21 21, 21, close close
merged
close
CAR ME CAR ME
Synergies
ME
− −− ×+ ×
=                                (5) 
To remove the effect of outliers, the value of synergies is winzorized at the 1% level for 
each group of mergers, and the groups are based on the RKRV overvaluation metric. 
Table 7 reports the mean and median synergies of OV, NOV, and cash acquisitions. 
Acquisitions made by OV stock bidders generate the lowest, and negative, synergies among 
these three groups. On average almost 20% of the merged firm’s market value of equity 
dissipates during the process of OV acquisitions, compared to a loss of 10.8% for NOV 
acquisitions and a gain of 2.8% for cash acquisitions. The differences are statistically 
significant in both the means and medians. This evidence clearly suggests that synergies 
cannot explain the substantially higher premiums paid by OV stock bidders, and also make 
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it difficult to explain OV bidders’ choice of acquisitions as a use of their overvalued stock 
relative to a seasoned equity offering.  
Diversifying acquisitions are generally considered more likely to be value-destroying 
(see, e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2007). As a quick test, we examine which group of 
acquisitions has more diversifying deals. A merger is classified as a diversifying deal if the 
bidder and target have different two-digit SIC codes. We find that 35% of the deals in the 
OV group are diversifying deals while only 28% of the NOV acquisitions are diversifying 
deals. A Chi-square test suggests that these percentages are statistically significantly 
different from one another. We find, however, that 43.5% of the cash acquisitions are 
diversifying deals, though cash deals on average generate positive synergies. One possible 
explanation is that the choice of cash as the method of payment is endogenous – target 
shareholders would likely prefer cash to stock if the acquirer is in a different industry. 
Amongst stock acquisitions, however, OV acquirers are much more likely to engage in a 
diversifying acquisition, and those acquisitions appear, on average, to destroy considerable 
value in the merged firm. 
5.2. Operating performance following mergers 
As noted above, using evidence from stock returns to infer value (or synergy) creation 
in mergers is problematic in this context because we are assuming that stock prices do not 
reflect intrinsic value for a substantial portion of our sample of acquirers. The stock price 
declines observed in Tables 5 and 6 may simply reflect correction of the overvaluation that 
we have identified as a principal determinant of the decision to go through an acquisition to 
begin with. To more directly address the question of whether mergers by OV acquirers 
  17 
fundamentally impair the firms’ operations, we examine operating performance after the 
deal is complete. An examination of post-completion operating performance sheds light on 
the source of economic gains or losses associated with the mergers in our sample, and 
allows us to evaluate whether the merger creates real value for existing shareholders. 
Our primary measure of operating performance is earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA, also called operating income before depreciation) 
divided by the market value of the assets at the beginning of the fiscal year.5 Market value 
of assets is the sum of the market value of equity and the book values of preferred stock and 
debt net of cash. We call this measure operating ROA. Another measure of operating 
performance is asset turnover, calculated as sales divided by the market value of assets at 
the beginning of the fiscal year. It measures the productivity of the firm’s assets. Panel A of 
Table 8 reports the median operating performance of merged firms from three years before 
the acquisitions to five years after the acquisitions, respectively for OV, NOV, and cash 
mergers. Operating performance before the merger is the weighted-average of the 
performance of the acquirer and target, with the weights being their relative market value of 
assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
We employ two different methods to examine abnormal changes in operating 
performance after mergers. The first method follows Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992). 
We first identify the industry median operating performance of the bidder and target 
respectively in each year, and then calculate their weighted-average. The weights are the 
                                                 
5 Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) argue that the rationale for using the market value of the assets rather than 
the book value to deflate operating income is that market value represents the opportunity cost of the assets 
and therefore facilitates intertemporal and cross-sectional comparisons. Furthermore, using the market value 
of assets mitigates any effects arising from the choice of the accounting method for mergers. 
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relative market value of assets of the two merging firms at the beginning of each year for 
the performance of the pre-merger years (years -3 to -1) and at the beginning of year 0 for 
the performance of year 0 and the post-merger years (years 1 to 5). Year 0 is the fiscal year 
that the merger is completed. We use Fama and French’s (1997) scheme to classify 
acquirers and targets into 48 industries, and use this weighted-average of the industry 
median performance as the benchmark for the merged firm. Abnormal operating 
performance, the difference between the operating performance of the merged firm and the 
benchmark performance, is calculated each year for each acquisition. We then run a cross-
sectional regression to compute abnormal changes in performance due to the mergers, 
,                          ,, post i pre i i PERFORMANCE PERFORMANCE =α βε ++
FORMANCE , is th
ANCE  , is the m
                     (6) 
where the explanatory variable, PER e median abnormal operating 
performance for the merging firms of acquisition i during the pre-merger years (years -3 to 
-1) and the dependent variable,PERFORM edian abnormal operating 
performance during the post-merger years (years 1 to 5). The slope coefficient 
, pre i
, post i
β  captures 
the possible correlation in abnormal performance between the pre-and post-merger years. 
The intercept α   me sures the average change in the industry-adjusted abnormal 
performance that is due to the merger, and is our main coefficient of interest.  
a
Barber and Lyon (1996) emphasize the importance of matching firm size and the pre-
event operating performance in estimating firms’ abnormal performance after events. 
Therefore, our second method adopts this approach. For every bidder and target firm, we 
find a control firm that (1) has total assets of 50%-150% of the merging firm, and (2) has 
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the closest operating ROA to the merging firm in the fiscal year before the merger. As a 
result, we have a pair of control firms for each pair of merging firms. Control firms are 
required to exist for at least three years and not to conduct seasoned equity offerings or be 
involved in acquisitions in the following five years. The weighted-average operating 
performance of the control firm pair is calculated each year as the benchmark performance 
for the merged firm. The weights are the relative market value of assets of the two merging 
firms at the beginning of fiscal year 0. Abnormal operating performance is the difference in 
operating performance of the merged firm and its benchmark. We compute the median 
abnormal operating performance over the five post-merger years to make statistical 
inferences.6  
Panel B of Table 8 presents the abnormal changes in operating performance after 
mergers. Consistent with Ghosh (2001), Healy, Pelepu, and Ruback’s (1992) method seems 
to yield more optimistic post-merger operating performance than the Barber and Lyon 
(1996) method does. The estimates of abnormal operating ROA generated using the first 
method (Healy, Pelepu, and Ruback’s (1992)) are consistently more positive for all three 
groups of acquisitions. However, both methods suggest significant deterioration in 
operating ROA following acquisitions driven by stock overvaluation. This deterioration can 
be at least partly attributed to a significant drop in asset turnover—the productivity of the 
merged firm’s assets.  
                                                 
6 Ghosh (2001) uses a similar method to examine post-merger operating performance for acquisitions. Using 
control firms matched on pre-merger performance and size, he finds no evidence that operating performance 
improves following acquisitions. He also shows that operating performance increases following cash 
acquisitions but decline for stock acquisitions. 
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Poor operating performance following OV acquisitions casts considerable doubt on the 
notion that these acquisitions generate large synergies. Even more puzzling, why would OV 
acquirers pay such high premiums to their targets when post-completion performance is so 
poor? What is the true motivation behind these transaction? Studies suggest that managerial 
incentives affect the magnitude of acquisition premiums. For example, Bargeron, 
Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter (2007) show that public acquirers pay significantly more 
than private acquirers in acquisitions. In that study, the difference in acquisition premiums 
between publicly-traded and privately-held acquirers cannot be explained by deal or target 
characteristics, but is related to the incentives of the acquiring firm managers. If the public 
acquirer has high managerial ownership, it pays a relatively lower acquisition premium. 
Therefore, we next turn to the issue of managerial incentives and compensation as a 
potential explanation for the high premiums and poor post-completion operating 
performance that we observe in OV acquisitions. 
 
6. Changes in compensation and wealth of acquirer CEOs after 
mergers 
Jensen (2005) proposes that equity overvaluation generates substantial agency costs, 
and suggests that ill-conceived acquisitions, driven by stock overvaluation, reflect these 
agency costs. Studies of CEO compensation suggest this is highly plausible. For instance, 
Grinstein and Hribar (2004) show that CEOs having more power to influence board 
decisions receive significantly larger M&A bonuses, but these bonuses are not related to 
deal performance. Based on 1,508 acquisitions during 1993-2000, Harford and Li (2007) 
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find that acquirer CEOs are significantly better off due to new stock and option grants 
following acquisitions. The addition of large new grants offset the wealth reduction of the 
CEO’s existing portfolio even for poorly performing firms. Moreover, CEO’s pay and 
wealth become insensitive to poor performance, but remain sensitive to good performance, 
after acquisitions.  
We investigate whether the real driver of OV acquisitions is CEO enrichment rather 
than stockholder wealth creation (the latter of which seems unlikely given our results so far). 
We follow the empirical approach in Harford and Li (2007) and decompose CEO 
compensation into two components: cash payments (including annual salary and bonus 
compensation) and new grants of restricted stock and stock options. Portfolio value of 
equity measures the market value of CEO’s holdings of stock and options at the end of the 
fiscal year. We compare these three variables (cash compensation, new grants, and portfolio 
value) in the fiscal year before the merger announcement (denoted by ayr-1) with their 
values in the fiscal year following the merger completion (denoted by cyr+1). CEO 
compensation data are obtained from Compustat’s ExecuComp database. Like Harford and 
Li (2007), we require that the CEO be the same between ayr-1 and cyr+1 for a given firm. 
Our sample consists of 164 OV bidders, 122 NOV bidders, and 198 cash bidders with 
available compensation data. All dollar values are adjusted by CPI index to 2006 dollar for 
comparison over time, and are reported in thousands. Due to the severe positive skewness 
in the compensation data, we report medians.7 
                                                 
7 Results based on means do not alter our qualitative conclusions and are available from the authors by request. 
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Overall, acquirer CEOs enjoy an increase in their wealth after acquisitions. Of the three 
groups, CEOs in OV acquisitions are able to enjoy the largest increase in wealth despite 
having the poorest acquisition performance (high premiums, low or negative synergies). 
Compared to year ayr-1, the median CEO of an OV acquirer obtains an increase in cash pay 
of $0.28 million, an increase in grants of $0.96 million, and an increase in portfolio value of 
equity of $2.70 million. However if the value of grants that the CEO obtains from the 
announcement year (ayr) to cyr+1 is deducted from the equity portfolio, the CEO realizes a 
loss of $4.42 million.8 The median value of cumulative grants from the announcement year 
to cyr+1 is over $10 million for the CEOs of OV acquisitions, compared to $7.63 million 
for the CEOs of NOV acquisitions and $5.84 million for the CEOs of cash acquisitions, 
which translate to 2.36%, 0.68%, and 1.89% of their deal value respectively.  
In summary, acquirer CEOs in OV acquisitions substantially increase their total wealth 
via a large amount of new grants of stock and options. Although their deals perform poorly 
resulting in large stock price drops for the acquirer (affecting the value of the CEO’s 
existing holdings in the company), the value addition due to new grants more than offsets 
the value loss on their existing portfolio of holdings in the acquirer. These results strongly 
suggest that agency costs might be the motivation for acquisitions by OV acquirers (Jensen 
(2005)) – their CEO’s experience large increases in wealth despite the fact that value 
creation for shareholders is negligible (or, even worse, negative). 
                                                 
8 In a separate analysis, we control for CEO transactions during this period, including buying or selling stocks 
and exercising stock options. Due to the availability of insider trading data, the control severely reduces the 
number of observations but does not change our qualitative conclusions. The stock and option transaction data 
are from the Thomson Financial’s database of insider trading. Tabulated results are available from the authors 
by request. 
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7. Conclusion 
Equity overvaluation potentially drives managers of the overvalued firm to pursue 
acquisitions. If the acquisition is financed using the firm’s overpriced equity, acquiring 
firms’ existing shareholders might benefit from this transaction by being able to use their 
inflated stock to buy other firm’s hard assets. In this study we show that the increase in the 
target’s stock price over the bid period, and the decrease in acquirer stock price over the 
same period, often shrink or even eliminate the relative overvaluation of the acquirer to the 
target by the date of completion. This relative price movement is driven by the substantial 
premium paid by the acquirer to the target, the market’s correction of acquirer stock 
overvaluation, and the lack of synergies of the deal itself. These findings cast substantial 
doubt on the notion that acquisitions by overvalued acquirers benefit acquirer shareholders.  
We also find that acquirer CEOs increase their wealth considerably after acquisitions, 
especially in the sub-sample of acquirers that appear overvalued before the deal is 
announced. Although the drop in stock price and the poor performance of the deal decrease 
the value of CEO’s holding of existing stock and options, the large amount of new stock 
and option grants more than offsets these losses. CEOs are clearly a beneficiary of 
acquisitions by overvalued acquirers, while acquirer shareholders are not. This evidence 
supports Jensen’s (2005) agency costs hypothesis. Equity overvaluation generates agency 
costs for the firm, by making it more difficult, or even impossible, for mangers to achieve 
the expected performance implied by the high level of stock price. This generates incentives 
for managers to pursue excessively risky investments – for example, ill-conceived 
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acquisitions that, ex-post, appear to destroy a considerable amount of wealth for all 
constituents other than the CEO herself.  
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Table 1: Distribution of mergers and acquisitions: 1985-2006 
 
The sample consists of 1,367 stock-financed, 692 cash-financed, and 990 mixed-financed mergers and 
acquisitions that are announced and completed during 1985-2006 in the U.S. market. The table presents the 
sample distribution by the calendar year of acquisition announcement. The following criteria are used to select 
the sample from the SDC Domestic M&A database: (1) Both the acquirer and target are public firms listed on 
the NYSE, the AMEX, or the Nasdaq; (2) The deal value is at least $10 million and at least 1% of the 
acquirer’s market value of equity; (3) The acquirer controls less than 50% of the target’s shares prior to the 
announcement and owns 100% of the target’s shares after the transaction; (4) Both the acquirer and the target 
have positive book value of equity and data items in the Compustat and CRSP merged database to compute 
the market-to-book ratio of assets at the fiscal year end before the announcement. The relative size of the deal 
is calculated as the ratio of the deal value to the acquirer’s existing market value of equity. The median across 
all the completed deals in each year is reported.  
 
Year  N  Stock  Cash  Mixed  Relative Size 
1985  80  26  34  20  0.38 
1986  91  15  51  25  0.31 
1987  83  23  33  27  0.27 
1988  84  21  41  22  0.20 
1989  60  19  23  18  0.38 
1990  37  16  9  12  0.24 
1991  51  28  4  19  0.38 
1992  48  28  6  14  0.25 
1993  67  31  17  19  0.29 
1994  165  96  35  34  0.17 
1995  211  131  39  41  0.26 
1996  217  110  33  74  0.29 
1997  307  174  41  92  0.26 
1998  305  177  40  88  0.29 
1999  278  130  48  100  0.21 
2000  223  104  38  81  0.23 
2001  177  82  24  71  0.22 
2002  94  27  27  40  0.15 
2003  143  46  34  63  0.23 
2004  149  45  45  59  0.23 
2005  108  25  30  53  0.21 
2006  71  13  40  18  0.23 
 




990  0.24 
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Table 2: Acquirer and target firm characteristics before the merger 
 
The sample consists of 1,367 stock acquisitions and 692 cash acquisitions during 1985-2006. This table 
reports the median of the following firm characteristic and performance variables at the fiscal yearend before 
the merger announcement: assets (Compustat data item 6), sales (data12), market-to-book value of assets 
((data24*data25+data6-data60)/data6), price-to-earning ratio (data24/data58), book leverage 
((data9+data34)/data6), operating ROA (data13/average total assets of fiscal year t-1), asset turnover 
(data13/data12), sales growth from fiscal year t-2 to fiscal year t-1, and the market-adjusted 12-month stock 
return (the buy-and-hold return during the 12 months prior to the announcement divided by the 
contemporaneous CRSP valued-weighted market return).  Assets and Sales are adjusted by CPI index to 
dollars of 2006.  
 
 
 Stock  Acquisitions 
 
Cash Acquisitions 
Variables Bidder  Target  Bidder  Target 
Assets 
($ million) 
1,898 327  2,239  185 
Sales 
($ million) 
668 105  1,545  155 
M/B assets 
 
1.40 1.22  1.41  1.25 
P/E ratio 
 
16.3 13.5  15.0  12.2 
Book leverage 
 
0.16 0.11  0.19  0.13 
Operating ROA 
 
0.11 0.11  0.14  0.12 
Asset turnover 
 
0.49 0.56  0.84  1.08 
Sales growth 
 
0.14 0.10  0.09  0.06 
Market-adjusted 12-
month return 
0.08 -0.02  -0.01  -0.02 
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Table 3: Overvaluation of merging firms before the announcement 
 
This table presents two measures of overvaluation for the merging firms during the period of 1985-2006. The first one is derived under the method 
proposed by Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005). The market-to-book equity ratio is decomposed into two components: misvaluation and 
long-run investment opportunities, Ln(M/B) = Ln(M/V) + Ln(V/B). The second measure, the industry-median-adjusted overvaluation, is calculated as Ind-
adj OV = ((M/B)it -(M/B)jt)/(M/B)it, where (M/B)it is the market-to-book equity ratio of stock i at t, and (M/B)jt is the median market-to-book equity ratio of 
industry j, to which stock i belongs at t. A positive value suggests overvaluation and a negative value suggests undervaluation. The sample consists of 
1,339 stock mergers and 664 cash mergers. The table reports the mean values for Ln(M/B), Ln(M/V) and Ln(V/B) and the median for Ind-adj OV due to its 
significant skewness. The last three columns report the differences in valuation ratios between groups. Statistical significance is tested by t-test for the 














Stock bidders – 
Cash bidders 
Stock bidders – 
Stock targets 
Cash bidders – 
Cash targets 
Ln(M/B)  1.03 1.17 0.78 0.75 0.83 0.60  0.39*  0.34*  0.18* 
Ln(M/V)  0.49  0.58  0.32  0.14  0.19  0.05  0.26*  0.39*  0.27* 
Ln(V/B)  0.54 0.59 0.46 0.61 0.64 0.56  0.13*  -0.05*  -0.10* 
Ind-adj OV  0.30  0.36  0.18  0.10  0.15  -0.02  0.18*  0.19*  0.20* 
 
  
Table 4: Relative overvaluation of stock-financed merging firms  
 
This table presents the relative overvaluation between the bidder and the target one month before the merger 
announcement and on the date of merger completion. It also shows the change in valuation ratios during the 
acquisition process for the two merging firms. Median values are reported in Panel B due to the skewness of 
Ind-adj OV. 
 
Panel A: RKRV’s measure of overvaluation – Ln(M/V) 
 
  Bidder  Target  Diff (Bidder – Target) 
(p-value) 
Before the merger 
announcement 
0.58 0.19  0.39 
(<0.001) 
On the date of merger 
completion 
0.54 0.48  0.06 
(0.033) 









Panel B: Industry-adjusted measure of overvaluation – Ind-adj OV 
 
  Bidder  Target  Diff (Bidder – Target) 
(p-value) 
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Table 5: Announcement period returns for acquirers and acquisition premium 
 
This table presents acquiring firms’ three-day [-1, +1] and full-period [-20, close], and target firms’ [-42, close] 
cumulative abnormal returns (in %) relative to the acquisition announcement day. Target firms’ CAR [-42, 
close] is interpreted as acquisition premium according to Schwert (1996). Close date is the completion date of 
the merger. Expected returns are estimated by the two-parameter market model where the CRSP valued-
weighted index is regarded as the market portfolio. The parameters are estimated based on daily stock returns 
from trading days -253 to -45. The p-values in parentheses for the mean and median CARs are generated by 
the t-test and the Wilcoxon signed rank test respectively. Differences in mean and median CARs between 
groups are tested respectively by the two-sample t-test and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. The sample 
includes 446 stock mergers driven by stock overvaluation (OV), 446 stock mergers not driven by stock 
overvaluation (NOV), and 664 cash mergers during 1985-2006. The classification of acquisition groups are 
based on the relative overvaluation measures derived from the RKRV method for Panel A and the industry-
adjusted OV for Panel B. 
 
Panel A:  Acquisition group classification based on the RKRV measure  
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Panel B:  Acquisition group classification based on industry-adjusted OV 
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Table 6: Can target and deal characteristics explain the higher premium paid by 
overvalued acquirers? 
 
The dependent variable is the acquisition premium (target firms’ CAR[-42, close]). OV is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the acquisition is in the OV group and zero otherwise. The market value of equity (MVE) is 
from CRSP calculated as the CPI-adjusted 2006 dollars price of the stock times the number of shares 
outstanding 63 days prior to the announcement date. Debt-to-assets (DEBT) is calculated as the book value of 
debt divided by the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of equity. Tobin’s q (Q) is defined as 
the firm market value divided by the book value of assets Operating cash flow (OCF) is defined as operating 
income divided by book value of assets. ARET_12 is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold return from 17 
months to 6 months before announcement. STDEV is defined as the standard deviation of the raw returns 
from trading day -253 to trading day -80 relative to the announcement date. STOCKLIQ is the measure of 
stock illiquidity of Amihud (2002). TENDER, TOEHOLD, HOSTILE, BIDLOCK, and TARTERM are 
indicator variables that equal one if the deal respectively is a tender offer, involves a bidder that holds 0.5% or 
more of the target stock prior to the announcement, is hostile, includes bidder lockup provisions, includes 
target termination fees. COMPETE is an indicator variable equal to one if more than one firm bid for the 
target. The first regression examines only stock mergers and the second regression includes both stock and 
cash mergers.  
 
  Stock mergers  Stock and cash mergers 
Variable Parameter 
Estimate 
Pr > |t|  Parameter 
Estimate 
Pr > |t| 
OV  0.1537  <.0001  0.1226  <.0001 
Ln(MVE)  -0.0596 <.0001 -0.0522 <.0001 
Q  0.0055 0.5748 0.0001 0.9842 
DEBT  0.0623 0.4663 -0.0309 0.5806 
OCF  0.1351 0.0723 0.0622 0.2973 
ARET_12  -0.1337 <.0001 -0.1526 <.0001 
HOSTILE  0.5134 0.0408 0.1652 0.0495 
COMPETE -0.0307  0.7634  0.0285  0.5977 
TENDER 0.0871  0.6179  0.1506  <.0001 
TARTERM  0.0691 0.0593 0.0557 0.0265 
TOEHOLD  -0.1832 0.0425 -0.0286 0.5571 
STDEV -0.6133 0.5597 -0.1242 0.8689 
BIDLOCK  -0.0105 0.7898 -0.0240 0.4064 
STOCKLIQ  -0.0023 0.2536 -0.0026 0.1180 
No. of Obs.  892    1555   
Adj. R
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Table 7: Acquisition synergies derived from stock returns 
 
Synergies are calculated as the sum of acquirer and target’s market value of equity prior to the announcement 
times their respective full-period CAR divided by the market value of equity of the merged firm at the month 
end of merger completion.  To remove the effects of outliers, the value of synergies is trimmed at 1% and 
99% for each group of mergers. The classification of acquisition groups are based on the relative 
overvaluation measures derived from the RKRV method. The last row shows the percentage of diversifying 
mergers for each acquisition group. A merger is classified as a diversifying deal if the bidder and the target 
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Table 8: Operating performance of mergers 
 
Panel A reports the median operating performance of merging firms from fiscal year -3 to +5, where year 0 is 
the fiscal year that the merger is completed. Operating ROA is calculated as operating income before 
depreciation (Compustat data item 13) scaled by the market value of assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
The market value of assets is defined as the market value of equity, plus book values of preferred stock and 
debt net of cash. The operating performance before the merger is a weighted-average performance of the 
bidder and the target, with the weights being their relative market value of assets at the beginning of the fiscal 
year. Asset turnover is calculated as sales divided by the market value of assets. The classification of 
acquisition groups are based on the relative overvaluation measures derived from the RKRV method. Panel B 
reports abnormal changes in operating performance after mergers, respectively based on Healy, Palepu, and 
Ruback’s (1992) method and the size and pre-merger performance match method suggested by Barber and 
Lyon (1996). Using the Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) method, we match the operating performance of 
merging firms to their weighted-average industry median performance and calculate the abnormal 
performance. We then run a cross-sectional regression of the median post-merger abnormal performance on 
the median pre-merger abnormal performance. The regression intercept is estimated as the change in 
abnormal performance due to the mergers. Using the Barber and Lyon (1996) method, each merging firm is 
matched to a control firm that has total assets of 50%-150% and the closest operating ROA of the merging 
firm in the year before the merger. Control firms exist for at least three years and do not conduct SEOs or 
acquisitions in the following five years. The benchmark performance for the merging firm is the weighted-
average performance of the control firms.  
 
Panel A: Median operating performance 
 
















-3  11.81 63.97    14.56 66.00    15.35  116.60   
-2  11.14 57.98    13.43 61.91    15.22  109.78   
-1  9.93 46.89    11.58  55.72    15.03  104.57   
0  9.70 44.75    12.86  59.34    16.29  117.99   
1  8.24  39.50   9.79  47.76   13.84  95.20  
2  7.85  38.42   9.55  42.99   12.85  97.43  
3  8.39  37.41   9.44  43.83   12.73  93.70  
4  9.07  41.62   8.75  39.87   12.34  89.78  
5  8.94  43.00   9.46  36.02   12.76  94.76  
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OV NOV  Cash  mergers 
 
Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) 
 














Barber and Lyon (1996) 
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Table 9: Changes in CEO compensation and wealth after acquisitions 
 
The sample consists of 164 OV acquisitions, 122 NOV acquisitions and 198 cash acquisitions with available 
CEO compensation data from Compustat’s ExecuComp. We require that CEOs be the same between the fiscal 
year before the acquisition announcement (ayr-1) and the fiscal year after the merger completion (cyr+1). 
Cash payment is the annual salary and bonus compensation. Grants are the total value of all restricted stock 
and options granted during the fiscal year. Cumulative grants are the value of grants from year ayr to year 
cyr+1. Portfolio value of equity is the market value of the CEO’s existing holding of stocks and options at the 
fiscal year end. The last rows present the changes of value deflated by the acquisition deal value. Median 




NOV Cash    mergers 
 
Year ayr-1 
Cash  payment  1,432 1,392 1,620 
Grants  2,565 1,566 2,488 
Portfolio value of equity   12,574  9,752  7,260 
 
Year cyr+1 
Cash  payment  1,626 1,544 1,805 
Grants  4,371 3,172 2,831 
Portfolio value of equity   15,123  11,500  10,894 
 
Change from year ayr-1 to cyr+1 
Change in cash payment  281  271  276 
Change in grants  956  676  25 
Change in portfolio value  2,698  1,873  2,471 
Cumulative grants  10,912  7,633  5,842 
Change in portfolio value net of 
cumulative grants 
-4,419 -1,686 -2,158 
 
Deflate changes of value by deal value (in %) 
Change in cash payment  0.05  0.02  0.07 
Change in grants  0.22  0.05  0.003 
Change in portfolio value  0.25  0.15  0.36 
Cumulative  grants  2.36 0.68 1.89 
Change in portfolio value net of 
cumulative grants 
-0.71  -0.20  -0.42 
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